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ACHIEVING THE BENEFITS OF A CENTRALIZED COMMUNITY PATENT
SYSTEM AT MINIMAL COST
Seth Cannont
L Introduction
After more than 25 years of discussion, the European Community (the
"EC") has not reached complete agreement on a proposed Community
patent system which would create a "unified" patent effective throughout
the European Union (the "EU").1 Even though the EC recently reached a
compromise on the translation regime,2 the EC continues to debate the
structure and jurisdiction of the proposed Community patent court . On the
one hand, businesses argue for a low cost, flexible, and easy to use system,
while on the other hand, several EU member states argue for a system in
which they maintain a degree of control over certain aspects of patent
prosecution and litigation. The International Chamber of Commerce (the
"ICC"), the world business organization, warns, however, that businesses
may not use such a system if too many compromises are made with regards
to these and other issues. In other words, large businesses, as well as
Small and Medium Enterprises ("SMEs"), individual inventors, and
universities, may not use the proposed Community patent system unless its
I B.S.E.E., Brigham Young University (2000); J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (2004). Recipient of the Journal of International Law
Distinguished Note Award (2003). I would like to thank Professor Hiram E. Chodosh,
Professor Peter M. Gerhart, David M. Carr, and Max W. Thomas for their insights and
comments. I would also like to thank the editorial staff for their hard work in preparing this
Note for publishing. Finally, I would like to thank my dear wife for her constant support as I
researched and wrote this Note.
1 Factiva Press Release Service, Industry Loses Out as EC Fails to Agree on Community
Patent, Nov. 15, 2002. By the time the author completed this note, EU governments reached
an agreement. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera, Deal Reached on Setting Up Single European
Patent, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 4, 2003, at 10.
2 See Results of Competitiveness Council, RAPID, Memo: 02/255, Nov. 15, 2002.
3 See Patently Absurd: The EU Should Consider a Fresh Start in its Patent Quest, FIN.
TIMEs (London), Nov. 15, 2002, at 20.
4 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, POLICY STATEMENT: PROPOSAL FOR A
COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE COMMUNITY PATENT, at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/
statements rules/statements/2001/communitypatent.asp (June 6, 2001) [hereinafter ICC
Policy Statement].
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benefits sufficiently outweigh its costs and measures are taken to minimize
these costs.
5
A centralized Community patent system brings significant benefits to
both its users and EU member states including low financial costs, legal
uniformity and certainty, efficiency, and the elimination of forum-
shopping.6 Once patent system users experience the benefits of the
Community patent, they will no longer have use for national patent
systems.7 Of course, EU member states will bear significant costs as the
Community patent system displaces their national patent systems. Also,
businesses lose the flexibility to choose, depending on their needs, between
the Community patent system and the European and national patent
systems. Without flexibility, SMEs and individual inventors in particular
have no choice but to use a Community patent system which may be more
distant than more familiar national patent systems. In summary, the
Community patent system costs EU member states the displacement of their
national patent systems and costs businesses lost flexibility from coexistent
patent systems and increased distance from a patent system. This note
demonstrates that, taking into account national and business interests, the
benefits of a centralized Community patent system far outweigh its costs,
especially in light of effective measures to minimize these costs.
Section II reviews how an inventor obtains, maintains, and enforces
patent rights under both the current patent system and the latest proposal for
a Community patent system. Section III analyzes in detail the major
benefits of the proposed Community patent system. Section IV analyzes in
detail the major costs of the proposed Community patent system. Finally,
Section V suggests ways to minimize the costs associated with the proposed
Community patent system.
I. The Current and Proposed Patent Systems
Structurally, the current European patent system essentially embodies
a decentralized patent system and the proposed Community patent system
essentially embodies a centralized patent system.8 Under a decentralized
5 See Nicholas Groombridge & Christopher Loh, Europe to See International Patent
Court?: While Efforts Have Attracted Little Attention in U.S., Potential Significance is
Enormous, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2001, at s4.
6 See, e.g., Community Patent: Make It Simple and Attractive, UNICE, Nov. 19, 2001.
7 See Jason R. Riley, The Community Patent, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the English Language, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 323
(2002).
8 The level of centralization of a patent system is analogous to the level of centralization
of a multi-agent control system in the field of robotics. At one end of the spectrum, a
completely decentralized multi-agent control system is composed of agents (normally
robots, analogous to individual countries each having their own national patent system)
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patent system, separate and independent institutions each use a distinct set
of means to grant, administer, and enforce patent rights. In contrast, under
a centralized patent system, a single institution uses a uniform set of means
to grant, administer, and enforce patent rights.
A. The Current European Patent System: A Decentralized
Approach
The current European patent system essentially embodies a
decentralized patent system. Even though a patent system user need only
submit a single patent application to the European Patent Office (the
"EPO"), when the patent grants, the result is not a single patent, but a
"bundle" of national patents.9 Prior to the creation of the EPO by the
European Patent Convention (the "EPC"),10 if a patent system user desired
to obtain a patent in multiple countries, she would have to apply to each
national patent office in each of those countries. Thus, Europe's national
patent systems constituted a decentralized patent system because each
component system acted independently from the others. In 1979, the EPC
created the EPO which centralized the European patent application process
by enabling a patent system user to apply to a single institution with
uniform search and examination laws and procedures to obtain patents from
designated national patent offices.11 Thereafter, decentralized national
patent systems maintain and enforce granted patent rights. Since the
"centralized" patent application process is relatively short compared to the
acting according to their own individual goals which are achieved by implementing control
laws or instructions in software. At the other end of the spectrum, a completely centralized
multi-agent control system is one in which a Supervisor (normally a central computer,
analogous to the Community patent court and the EPO within the Community patent system)
communicates control laws, computed in software according to an overarching goal, to each
individual agent who acts accordingly. Then there are hybrid multi-agent control systems
that have both centralized and decentralized attributes. The current European patent system
is analogous to such a hybrid system - roughly speaking, the patent prosecution process
through the EPO is centralized and the litigation process, involving litigation in individual
countries, is decentralized. See, e.g., Fabrizio Giulietti, Lorenzo Pollini & Mario Innocenti,
Autonomous Formation Flight, IEEE CONTROL SYsTEMs MAGAZINE, Dec. 2000, at 34.
9 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5,
1973, arts. 2(2), 64(1) (European Patent Office Publishing, 11 th ed. 2002) [hereinafter EPC],
available at http://www3.european-patent-office.org/dwld/epc/epc_2002 vl .pdf (last visited
Mar. 22, 2004).
'
0 Id. art. 4.
"I See id. arts. 2(2), 4(3).
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potential "decentralized" life of a European patent, 12 the European patent
system essentially embodies a decentralized patent system.
In sum, an inventor, whether a business, university, or individual, may
obtain patent protection throughout the EU by hiring a patent attorney to
file and prosecute1 3 a patent application with the EPO. After the patent
grants, the patentee must pay annual renewal fees to both the European and
national patent offices to maintain the patent, and, if necessary, litigate in
national courts.
1. Obtaining a Patent under the European Patent System
In Europe, the first step in the patenting process is to determine where
to file a patent application. Currently, the applicant has two options: the
national patent offices or the EPO. 14 If the inventor chooses to obtain a
national patent, most national patent offices recommend that the inventor
procure the services of a patent attorney or patent agent. 15 The inventor or
his representative files the completed patent application with the national
patent office accompanied by a fee. 16 An inventor who desires to apply for
a patent in multiple European nations would likely choose to apply for a
European patent because the inventor only has to file a single application.
The EPC governs the process of obtaining and maintaining a European
patent. 17 An inventor or his patent attorney must prepare an application in
12 The European patent term is twenty years from the application filing date. EPC, supra
note 9, art. 63(1). Although, the average European patent has a ten-year life-span. Results
of the Internal Market/Consumer Affairs/Tourism Council, RAPID, Memo: 01/388, Nov. 26,
2001. For the year 2001, 50% of applications filed with the EPO were granted in less than
51.3 months. EPO, 2001 Ann. Rep., available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/an-rep/2001/pdf/an rep_01 _en.pdf (2001).
13 In the context of patent law, "prosecution" means the interchange between the patent
attorney and the patent office after the attorney files the patent application and before the
patent office grants the patent.
14 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, COM(00)412.
15 See, e.g., Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, FAQ - Hiiufig gestellte Fragen, at
http://www.dpma.de/infos/faq/faqp.html#pat5 (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (explaining that a
patent agent is essentially a patent prosecutor). See THE UK PATENT OFFICE, USING A
CHARTERED PATENT AGENT, at http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/howtoapply/chartered.htm
(last modified Dec. 12, 2000) ("A patent agent is a professional qualified in intellectual
property law who acts on behalf of an applicant for the purposes of drafting a patent
application and then taking that patent application through the various stages needed to grant
the patent.").
16 See How much does a patent cost?, IPR-Helpdesk Articles, at
http://www.certh.gr/cordis/t-en/i/i-410 en.asp-adt-id=809&ads=129.htm (last visited July
26, 2004).
17 EPC, supra note 9, art. 4.
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one of the three EPO languages,1 8 designating desired contracting states, 19
and file it at the EPO in Munich or its branch at The Hague 20 accompanied
by filing and search fees.21 EPO employees then search and examine the
patent pursuant to the patentability requirements and procedures outlined in
the EPC and its implementing regulations.22 When the EPO grants the
patent, a "bundle" of patents results comprising patents for each contracting
state that the inventor designated.23 The patent then becomes effective in
each designated contracting state once a translation is filed with each of
these states.24
2. Maintaining and Enforcing a Patent under the European
Patent System
After the EPO grants a European patent, it has the same value as a
national patent because the patentee must file translations,2pay renewal fees,
and institute judicial action in each contracting state. The patentee
maintains a granted patent by paying annual renewal fees to both the EPO
and each designated contracting state.26 When another party infringes the
patent in a designated contracting state, the patentee has to institute an
action in that state's court system. This requires the costly services of a
patent attorney not only authorized and trained to bring a suit before that
state's court, but also fluent in the state's official language.28 If the state's
court finds the patent valid and infringed, contracting states vary as to the
18 Id. art. 14(1). The official languages of the EPO are English, French, and German. Id.
'9Id. art. 79.
20 Id. art. 75(1)(a).
21 Id. art. 78(2).
22 See id. arts. 90-96.
23 See id arts. 2(2), 64(1).
24 Id. art. 137(2)(b); Promoting Innovation Through Patents: Green Paper on the
Community Patent and the Patent System in Europe, COM(97)314, at 4 [hereinafter Green
Paper].
25 THE COMMUNITY PATENT: THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE
FUTURE, Study Day Organised in Liege on 29 November 2001 under the Auspices of the
Belgian Presidency of the EU and the Scientific Direction of the Consumer Law Centre, 7
[hereinafter Liege Report], available at http://mineco.fgov.be/intellectualproperty/
presidency/finalreport en.pdf.
26 EPC, supra note 9, art. 86(1); see id. art. 39(1).
27 Jan J. Brinkhof, Patent Litigation in Europe: Two Sides of the Picture, 9 FED. CIR. B.J.
467, 467 (2000).
28 See Riley, supra note 7, at 313-314.
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appropriate remedy. The remedy can range from damages to injunctions
depending on the state's policy standards to prevent patent infringement.29
If an infringing act occurs in more than one EU member state and
the patentee desires to enforce her patent rights, she must bring her
complaint before the courts of each EU member state. 30 The Netherlands
courts, acknowledging the burdens of such a system on a patentee, have
issued judgments that extend beyond its own borders.3 1  The Dutch
Supreme Court began this practice in the 1989 Lincoln v. Interlas case in
which Interlas, a Dutch company, imported, modified, and resold
throughout Europe diesel welding units manufactured by a U.S. company
bearing the trademark "Lincoln.",32 In response, the Dutch owners of the
"Lincoln" trademark sued Interlas.3 3 The Dutch Supreme Court sustained a
lower court's decision to issue an injunction effective in the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxemburg. 34  Thereafter, the Dutch lower courts have
applied these principles to patent infringement suits.35 Therefore, patentees
may obtain cross-border injunctions in the Netherlands' courts; however,
other states are under no obligation to enforce such a judgment.36
B. The Proposed Community Patent System: A Centralized
Approach
The Community patent system proposed by the European
Commission3 7 embodies a centralized patent system in which an inventor
can obtain, maintain, and enforce a patent through a single institution. The
Community Patent Convention (the "CPC"), signed on December 15, 1975,
constitutes the first attempt to set forth a framework for a centralized patent
29 John Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention for the Acquisition and
Enforcement ofInternational Rights, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 83, 84 (2002).
30 Id.
31 See Wolfgang V. Meibom and Johann Pitz, Cross-border Injunctions in International
Patent Infringement Proceedings, 8 E.I.PR. 469, 469 (1997); see also Gretchen Ann
Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. The European Union, 40
IDEA 49, 68 (2000).





36 Mills, supra note 29, at 88.
37 The European Commission drafts and presents legislative proposals to the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union. See Institutions of the European Union,
available at http://europa.eu.int/institutions/index-en.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
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system in Europe.38 The CPC provides that the EPO grant a patent having a
"unitary" and "autonomous" character. 39 Thus, a Community patent has
equal effect in the states contracting to the convention and is only subject to
the provisions of both the EPC and the CPC. 40 The CPC further provides
that a patentee only pay renewal fees to the EPO41 and gives jurisdiction to
the Court of Justice of the European Communities as the court of last
resort.42 In the end, however, the EU member states did not ratify the CPC
because they found it undesirable.43
EU member states made a second attempt at instituting a
Community patent by amending the CPC on December 15, 1989. The
amendment outlines a "protocol on the settlement of litigation concerning
the infringement and validity of community patents" and introduces a
Common Appeal Court.44 As with the original CPC, the amended CPC did
not enter into force because only seven of the required twelve EU member
states ratified it.45 Since then, the Commission has made significant efforts
to arrive at a Community patent system agreeable to all interested parties.46
Despite the Commission's efforts, disagreement among EU member states
regarding judicial arrangements continues to block the creation of a
Community patent system.47
38 Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (Community Patent
Convention), 1976 O.J. (L 17) 1 [hereinafter CPC].
39 See id. art. 2.
40id.
41 Id. art. 48.
42 See id. arts. 5, 63.
43 See Michael Burnside, The Community Patent Convention: Is It Obsolete In Its Present
Form?, 14 E.I.P.R. 285 (1992).
44 Agreement Relating to Community Patents, art. 1, 1989 O.J. (L 401) 1 [hereinafter
Luxembourg Agreement].
45 France, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands ratified the amended CPC. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Community Patent, COM(00)412 final, at 5 [hereinafter Regulation Proposal]. It is
generally thought that the CPC failed because of the excessive Community patent costs and
the complexity of the judicial system. Interested parties felt that the CPC requirement that a
patent be translated into every Community language would result in excessive costs.
Moreover, interested parties distrusted giving national judges the power to declare a patent
invalid throughout the entire Community. Id.
46id.
47 See Industrial Property: Patent Negotiations Deadlocked in Council, EUROPEAN
REPORT, Jan. 18, 2003.
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1. Obtaining a Patent under the Community Patent System
An inventor desiring to obtain a Community patent follows the same
procedures that an inventor applying for a Europeanpatent follows because
the EPO governs the grant of Community patents.4 However, instead of
designating particular contracting states to the EPC in which the inventor
seeks patent protection, the inventor designates the entire Community.49
2. Maintaining and Enforcing a Patent under the Community
Patent System
After grant, unlike a European patent, the Community patent takes on
a "unitary" and "autonomous" character. 50 In line with this centralized
character, the patentee pays renewal fees solely to the EPO to maintain his
patent rights. If throughout the patent's life, activity in any EU member
state infringes the patent, the patentee or the infringer may bring suit
against the opposing party in a Community intellectual property court of
first instance (the "chamber of first instance").5'
Initially, a central chamber of first instance attached to the Court of
First Instance of the European Communities, composed of four legal and
three technical judges, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all Community
patent suits. 52 In succeeding calendar years, if cases brought before the
central chamber exceed 150, then a regional court of first instance is
established within that EU member state or within that territory containing
a group of EU member states having the most litigators appearing before
the central chamber in that year. 3 Once regional courts are established,
they exercise jurisdiction over actions against defendants domiciled in that
state or territory.54 In all other actions, including actions against two or
more defendants domiciled in different EU member states, the central
chamber exercises jurisdiction. 55 Either party may then appeal a judgment
48 Regulation Proposal, supra note 45, art. 1.
41 Id. art. 2(4).
50 ld. art. 2(1)-(2).
51 Id. art. 30. These actions include invalidity, infringement, declarations of non-
infringement, the use of the patent or the right based on prior use of the patent, requests for
limitation, counterclaims for invalidity, and declarations of lapse. Id. art. 30(1).
52 Commission Working Document on the Planned Community Patent Jurisdiction,
COM(02)480 final, arts. 1, 4 [hereinafter Working Document on Jurisdiction].
5 Id. art. 5.




of a chamber of first instance to the Community intellectual property court
of appeals (the "chamber of appeals").56
X. The Benefits of a Centralized Patent System
By adopting a centralized patent system, EU member states and their
inventors not only reap important benefits, but also bear significant costs.
For the most part, all costs result from the displacement of the decentralized
European patent system currently in place. The proposed Community
patent system attempts to alleviate the costs by allowing the centralized and
decentralized systems to co-exist. 57 This solution, however, merely avoids
the costs. If the benefits of the Community patent system enjoyed by
inventors do in fact outweigh its costs, then more inventors will use the
centralized patent system and use the decentralized system less, thereby
displacing the decentralized system.58 Thus, the costs resulting from the
potential displacement of the current decentralized patent system should be
addressed in a costibenefit analysis.
When compared to the U.S. and Japanese patent systems, the European
patent system suffers from high cost, legal uncertainty, and inefficiency,
even in light of successful measures taken under the EPC to centralize the
patent grant procedure. A centralized patent system, on the other hand,
brings benefits to both EU member states and businesses that would allow it
to compete with the U.S. and Japanese patent systems. The four major
benefits are low financial cost to inventors, legal uniformity and certainty,
efficiency, and the elimination of forum-shopping.
A. Low Financial Cost to Patent System Users
One of the primary benefits of a centralized Community patent system
is the low financial costs to businesses, universities, and individual
inventors in obtaining, maintaining, and enforcing patents in Europe. 9 In
2000, the average total cost to obtain and maintain a European patent
designating eight states was approximately EUR 49,900.60 This cost was
56 1d. art. 39(1).
57 Regulation Proposal, supra note 45, at 19.
58 Riley, supra note 7, at 323.
'9 See id. at 300-306. Consumers could also benefit. See Philip Leith, Revision of the
EPC, the Community Patent Regulation and European Technical Judges, 23 E.I.P.R. 250
(2001).
60 Commission Proposes the Creation of a Community Patent, RAPID, IP/00/714, July 5,
2000 [hereinafter Community Patent Proposal]. This figure has not changed considerably
since July 5, 2000. See Schedule of Fees and Costs of the EPO, O.J. of the EPO (Supp. Nov.
2001), available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/ojOO1/11_01/11
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three to five times the cost to obtain and maintain a patent in Japan or the
U.S. in the same year.6' This cost-gap puts European innovators at a
disadvantage in comparison with their Japanese and U.S. competitors, thus
hindering innovation.6 2  Furthermore, the high costs of obtaining and
maintaining a European patent may delay or deter small and medium-sized
enterprises ("SMEs") and commercially small inventors, who have limited
financial resources, from using the patent system.63 In contrast, the average
costs for obtaining and maintaining the proposed Community patent in an
enlarged 27-member EU amounts to about EUR 23,805, under half the cost
for a European patent designating only eight states.64 Such a low financial
cost moves the Community patent closer into position to compete with U.S.
and Japanese yatents, which on average cost between EUR 10,000 and
EUR 15,000. Moreover, this price provides SMEs and individual
inventors with easier access to a European-wide patent system.
The financial cost incurred by inventors to obtain and maintain a
European patent have four major components: first, the fees initially
incurred to obtain a patent which include the filing, examination, and
granting fees; second, the cost of professional representation before the
EPO; third, fees for translating the patent into the designated states' official
languages; and, fourth, EPO and national renewal fees.66 And, of course,
the patentee may have to bear the financial cost of enforcing the patent.
supl.pdf [hereinafter EPO Fee Schedule]. The Euro ("EUR") is approximately equivalent to
the United States dollar ("USD").
61 See id. This figure has changed little since July 5, 2000 because the fees charged by the
U.S. and Japan patent offices have not changed considerably since then. See UNITED STATES
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO FEES - FY 2003, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2OO3OlOl.htm [hereinafter USPTO Fee
Schedule]; see JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE CHANGES - SCHEDULE OF
FEES, at http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/ryokine.htm [hereinafter Japan Fee Schedule].
62 Lisbon Strategy: Status 2003, UNICE, Dec. 2002.
63 The Chartered Institute of Patent Agents (CIPA), Green Paper on the Community
Patent and the Patent System in Europe. COM(97) 314 Final. Comments and Responses to
Questions A 4.5.1, at http://www.cipa.org.uk/info ip_pros/notecommarticle.cfi?
NoticelD=32&ArchiveDesired=Yes (last visited Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter CIPA
Comments]; see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council,
COM(02)2 final at 20-21.
64 This cost assumes that only the claims are translated into all the official languages. AF,
Industrial Property: Council Fails to Make any Progress on Community Patent, European
Report, May 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13766042 [hereinafter Council Fails].
65 The author calculated these figures based on the U.S. and Japanese fee schedules for
2003. See USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 61; see Japan Patent Office, supra note 61.
66 See Cost of an Average European Patent, EPO, at http://www.european-patent-




1. Reduced Translation Fees
After the EPO awards an average European patent, which designates
eight EPC contracting states, the EPC requires that the patentee translate
her patent into the official languages of these states.68 Translation fees
associated with such a patent amount to EUR 12,600 and constitute about
25 % of the total cost to obtain and maintain the patent.69 Translations
under the original Community patent proposal, contained in the 1989 CPC,
cost the patentee even more because the CPC requires translations into the
eleven official languages of all fifteen EU member states.70  These
translations cost patentees about EUR 17,00071 and the cost only increases
as additional countries join the EU.
The latest translation proposal, finding support from several
organizations representing businesses significantly reduces translation
costs compared to the EPC and CPC. 71 Under this proposal, the inventor
must translate the entire patent into one of the EPO languages (i.e., English,
French, and German) and, upon gant, he must translate the claims into the
remaining two EPO languages. 7 rUnder this proposal patent system users
only pay EUR 2,200 for translations.74
Despite the lowered translation cost that the EPO language solution
brings to inventors, business organizations prefer the English-only solution
in which patents are prosecuted and granted in English without any further
translations. 75 The English-only solution not only brings translation costs to
a minimum, but is supported by evidence that patent translations are rarely
used and English prevails in technology and education in Europe.
67 Community Patent Proposal, supra note 60.
68 EPC, supra note 9, art. 137(2).
69 Community Patent Proposal, supra note 60.
70 See Luxembourg Agreement, supra note 44, at arts. 29-30.
71 Community Patent Proposal, supra note 60.
72 See ICC Policy Statement, supra note 4; UNICE Detailed Comments on the Proposal
for a Regulation creating a Community Patent, Jan. 9, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter UNICE
Detailed Comments].
73 Community Patent Proposal, supra note 60.
74 Id. This translation regime would save the users of the patent system EUR 10,500.
75 See EFPIA Reviews European Community Patent Situation and Industry Position,
MARKETLETTER, Jan. 28, 2002 [hereinafter EFPIA Reviews]; UNICE Position Paper on the
Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent System in Europe, Oct. 31, 1997; see
Industrial Property: MEPs Postpone Vote on Controversial Plans for EU Patent,
EUROPEAN REPORT, Mar. 16, 2002; see also Riley, supra note 7, at 301-307 (describing the
English-only solution).
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In practice, patent translations are rarely consulted.76 A recent study
found that at "the Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle, the French
national institute of industrial property rights, translations are consulted in
only 2 percent of cases.",7 7  Indeed, "when a patent is in dispute or
negotiation, everyone reads the text of the patent application in its original
language to reach the greatest level of understanding., 78 In other words,
everyone reads the patent application in its original language because a
measure of understanding is lost in the translation process. Without the
requisite level of technical expertise, a translator could modify or lose a
patent's critical details in the translation process, thus changing the scope of
the patent. 79 Therefore, any solution, such as the English-only solution and,
to a lesser extent, the EPO language solution,8° requiring fewer translations
assures an efficient use of translations and reduces the incidence of
mistranslation or the need for costly translators having technical expertise.81
Of course, no solution completely eliminates translations because even
the English-only solution requires at most a single translation into English.
But, the English-only solution is less of a burden to inventors when
considering evidence showing the prevalent use of English in Europe.
First, English is the accepted language of technology.82 Second, English is
taught in 90% of the high schools in the EU.83 And third, 70% of patent
applications are applied for in English.84 Thus, most users of the European
76 Conunity Patent Proposal, supra note 60.
77 Simon Stokes, European Community: Patents - Commission Proposes the Creation of
a Community Patent, 22 (10) E.I.P.R. nn. 155 -156 (2000).
78 Vincenzo Di Cataldo, From the European Patent to a Community Patent, 8 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 19, 29 (2002).
79 Cf Grace Leonard, Patents and Translation, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 561,
564 (1994) (discussing the technical expertise and superior writing abilities demanded of
translators).
80 Alternatively, patent system users could be required to provide a translation into either
English or French considering that French has been the language of European culture and
was once the language of diplomacy. Riley, supra note 7, at 301 n.16. Although Germany
might object to such a proposal, arguing that it has the largest population in the EU and it
produces more patents than any other country. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, 2000 FACTS AND
FIGURES 15, at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/facts figures/facts2000/pdf/facts-figures_00.pdf (2001) [hereinafter EPO
Facts and Figures].
81 Cf Leonard, supra note 79, at 564 (discussing the expense of hiring translators and the
additional surcharges hidden within translating projects).
82 EFPIA Reviews, supra note 75.
83 Riley, supra note 7, at 303.
84 Michael Becket, Why Europe has a Patent on Absurdity: Michael Becket on Attempts
to Simplify the System, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 27, 2002; Bojan Pretnar, How to
Reduce High Translation Costs of European Patents, 18 E.1.P.R. 665, 666 (1996).
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patent system know and use the English language on an ongoing basis and
only a minority of inventors would have to make the single translation into
English. As a result, the English-only solution completely eliminates
translation costs for a majority of the patent system users and significantly
reduces translation costs for a minority.
SMEs and individual inventors are particularly sensitive to the
translation issue owing to the translation expense. 85 Larger businesses, on
the other hand, view translations as part of doing business in Europe,
because they have easy access to the services of independent, agency, and
in-house translators.86 SMEs and individual inventors located in EU
member states whose official language does not fall within an EPO official
language are at a disadvantage compared to other inventors located in EU
member states having as its official language an EPO official language.87
To put SMEs and individual inventors on a level playing field with each
other and larger businesses, the EPO or the EU member states could
subsidize translation costs for those users who are disadvantaged because
their official language is not an EPO language. 88  The EPO or the EU
member states would likely not be burdened by such a measure when
considering that the EPO languages are the official languages of those EU
member states who not only have the greatest populations, 89 but have
inventors and businesses that are major users of the patent system. 90
In sum, the latest translation proposal for the Community patent
significantly reduces translation costs by requiring fewer translations.
Business organizations agree, however, that a patent system working in the
English language would be ideal considering its wide use in education,
business, and technology.91 Nonetheless, business organizations also agree
85 Another translation issue affecting SMEs and individual inventors is notice. Riley,
supra note 7, at 307 ("How can a third party become aware of a patent's scope if he cannot
understand the definitions of its claims?").
86 See Leonard, supra note 79, at 562.
87 See Brinkhof, supra note 27, at 471.
88 The Commission suggests public financing (or part-financing) to support SMEs having
difficulty securing protection for their inventions. Green Paper, supra note 24, at 20.
89 In 2002 the most populated countries in Europe besides Russia were Germany with
82.4 million, the United Kingdom with 60.2 million, and France with 59.5 million. Italy,
having a population of 58.1 million, is the only other country in Europe that approaches the
population of France within 10 million. 2002 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET OF THE
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU at http://www.prb.org//Content/ContentGroups/
Datasheets/wpds2002/2002_WorldPopulationDataSheet.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
90 See EPO Facts and Figures, supra note 80, at 15.
91 UNICE Position Paper on the Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent
System in Europe, Intellectual Property Rights: Compendium of UNICE Position Papers,
Oct. 31, 1997, at 8.
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that the latest translation proposal sufficiently reduces current translation
costs, particularly for SMEs and individual inventors.92
2. Reduced Renewal Fees
Currently, translation fees are not the only costs that add considerably
to the cost of obtaining and maintaining a patent; patentees must also pay
"exorbitantly" high renewal fees to each designated national patent office
every year.93 In 1997 50% of renewal fees were paid to national
governments, the balance going to the EPO for managing the patent grant
procedure.94 Today, an even greater percentage of renewal fees are paid to
national patent offices: A patent having a ten-year term and designating
eight EU member states costs the patent holder about EUR 12,000 in
national renewal fees 95 versus the EPO's EUR 5,425 in renewal fees.
96
Extending the patent term beyond ten years results in even more costly
renewal fees, especially national renewal fees. A twenty-7Year patent term
costs the patent holder EUR 15,625 in EPO renewal fees9 and about EUR
56,000 in national renewal fees.
98
The centralized Community patent system, by comparison, eliminates
national renewal fees because the Community patent creates a "unitary"
patent unlike the "bundle" of national patents created by the current
European patent system.99 Thus, patentees pay renewal fees only to the
EPO and avoid having to pay costly renewal fees to designated EU member
states.
92 See, e.g., ICC Policy Statement, supra note 4 (In fact, the ICC praised the Commission
for its "politically ingenious solution" in which an inventor files a patent application in one
of the three EPO official languages and on grant translates the claims into the other two
official languages.).
93 James Dyson, Letters to the Editor - Why Europe's Inventors Need a Centralized
Patent System, FIN. TIMEs, July 19, 2002, at 16.
94 Green Paper, supra note 24, at 5.
95 See National Law: VI. Payment of Renewal Fees for European Patents, EPO, at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/national/e/vi.htm [hereinafter National Renewal
Fees]. This figure was calculated based on the 2002 national renewal fees for the following
eight EU member states: Germany, France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland,
Italy, Sweden, and Finland.
96 See EPO Fee Schedule, supra note 60, at 4.
97 See National Renewal Fees, supra note 95.
98 See EPO Fee Schedule, supra note 60, at 4.




The Council of the European Union100 suggests that renewal fees for
the Community patent should not exceed the EUR 5,425 renewal fee
currently charged by the EPO for an average patent with a ten-year term. 101
But, even if the Community patent renewal fees equaled the current EPO
renewal fees, they are double the USPTO renewal fees. 10 2  In UNICE's
view, the Community patent renewal fees should be substantially less than
the renewal fees for an average European patent.10 3 The renewal fees could
further be reduced, at least for SMEs, individual inventors, and universities,
by introducing a special scale of fees as has been done in the U.S. (e.g., a
50% discount). 04 Arguably, a special scale could be applied to the current
renewal fees, however, this would not effect a significant change in renewal
fees because a patentee must still pay costly national fees. Thus, a
centralized patent system, in which a patentee pays renewal fees solely to
the EPO, together with a special scale of fees favoring SMEs, individual
inventors, and universities sufficiently reduces patent renewal fees.
3. Reduced Litigation Fees
Litigating a European patent is expensive. Individual proceedings
must be brought in each EU member state in which the patentee desires to
enforce his patent rights. 10 5  Litigation costs add up quickly when
considering that the standard price for a single patent proceeding in the
United Kingdom is GBP one million and the standard price in Germany is
GBP 200,000.106 Even though SMEs and individual inventors rarely find
10o The Council of the European Union is the main decision-making body of the EU
comprising representatives from the EU member states. See INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, at http://europa.eu.int/inst-en.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
101 See EPO Fee Schedule, supra note 60, at 4.
102 U.S. renewal fees for a ten year patent term currently amount to about EUR 2,800.
Japanese renewal fees for a patent having fifteen claims and a ten year term currently
amount to about EUR 4,620.
103 UNICE Position Paper on the Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent
System in Europe, Intellectual Property Rights: Compendium of UNICE Position Papers,
Oct. 31, 1997, at9.
'04 Id. at 22.
105 Hugh Laddie, National I.P. Rights: A Moribund Anachronism in a Federal Europe, 23
E.I.P.R. 402, 406 (2001).
106 Leader: Matheu Swallow, THE LAWYER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 3. The difference in cost is
attributed to the UK's costly discovery procedures. Paul Cole, Centralized Litigation for
European Patents: New Proposals for Inclusion in the EPC Revision Package, 23 E.I.P.R.
219, 222 (2001). Germany has no discovery process. David Perkins & Garry Mills, Patent
Infringement and Forum Shopping in the European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 549, 601.
The Great Britain Pound ("GBP") is approximately equivalent to one and a half United
States dollars ("USD").
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themselves in court, 10 7 should the need arise, SMEs and individual
inventors cannot afford to bring proceedings before two, three, or even
twenty different national court systems with differing procedures and
languages. 10 8  Thus, SMEs and individual inventors are significantly
disadvantaged in relation to larger businesses with deep pockets.
As in the U.S. and Japan, a centralized Community patent court
requires only one proceeding in the first instance. 0 9 Thus, patentees only
have to pay court and legal fees for a single proceeding.
In addition, litigation costs under the Community patent will likely be
less than that incurred in countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. because
the common law procedures of discovery and cross-examination will
probably not be used in light of the procedural rules already established by
a parallel proposal to the Community patent - the European Patent
Litigation Protocol (the "EPLP"). The EPLP, a proposed amendment to the
EPC recently drawn up in reaction to the persistent difficulty in obtaining
the required unanimity to adopt the Community patent system, 11°
establishes procedures for a centralized European patent court referred to as
the European Patent Judiciary having jurisdiction over the European
patent."' The EPLP does not propose discovery procedures similar to
those in the UK and other common law countries because they are
burdensome, time-consuming," 12 and add appreciably to costs. 113
On the other hand, the common law's thorough testing of evidence,
especially through cross-examination, assures better decisions whether or
not a patent should be enforced, especially when much is at stake (e.g., an
expensive plant and its equipment could be shut down). 14  The EPLP,
however, recognizing the benefit of the common law's discovery
107 See Liege Report, supra note 25, at 24. SMEs rarely seek to protect their inventions
because of the prohibitive costs. See id.
108 See Brinkhof, supra note 27, at 468 (Giving a short list of procedural differences
among European national court systems). In fact, many SMEs can hardly afford to litigate
in the United States. Id. at 469. There are currently 20 contracting states to the EPC.
GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION (2d ed. 2001).
109 Regulation Proposal, supra note 45, art. 30(3).
110 The EPLP developed from discussions amongst the Working Party on Litigation,
chaired jointly by Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, government delegations, and
other business and intellectual property organizations. Jan Willems, Third Proposal for an
EPLP, Aug. 27, 2001, 3-7 [hereinafter EPLP].
111 Id.
112 In 2001, the UK resolved or "heard just 26 applications or trials in the first six months
of this year, while its rival in Germany heard around 600." Leader: Matheu Swallow, THE
LAWYER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 3.
13 See Cole, supra note 106, at 222.
114 ld. at 222-223.
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procedure, proposes a system "in which the court may, on request of a
party, order the other party to bring certain documents into the proceedings
and/or allow inspection of the (original) document."'1 15
Since the EPLP procedures represent the views of most European
delegations, it is likely that the Community patent system will adopt similar
procedures, and thus keep the cost of litigation lower than it otherwise
would be if it adopted the complete common law discovery procedures. By
securing a lower cost, however, the Community patent sacrifices high
quality decisions.
B. Legal Uniformity and Certainty
A centralized patent system promotes legal uniformity and certainty.
Legal uniformity is established when judges interpret and apply patent law
and procedure uniformly among members of the centralized patent system.
A single high court of last resort composed of judges with judicial
experience in patent law assures such uniformity. Legal uniformity benefits
patent system users by eliminating the possibility of two judicial
proceedings trying the same issue coming to different conclusions. The
judicial experience and technical expertise that a centralized patent system
attracts contributes towards legal certainty because the judges could better
come to sound decisions than judges in the national courts, many of whom
do not have much experience in patent law. This also benefits patent
system users by providing them with confidence in the judicial system.
Critics have argued that "a single court is no guarantee of
uniformity, particularly if its personnel and resources are appropriated from
the present piecemeal system."' 16 Of course, judges and personnel coming
from various EU member states come into a new Community patent system
having been influenced by their own distinct court systems. For example,
members of the UK bar, in particular, are apparently uncomfortable with
having technical "non-lawyer" judges on the judge panels because no such
judges are allowed to pass judgment in the UK's high courts.'17
Furthermore, the thoroughness of common law trial procedure found in the
UK courts, especially cross-examination, will likely not be encompassed
within the procedures of the Community patent system. 18
Even assuming that judges and personnel drawn from the national
patent systems have similar legal backgrounds, they would still have
It5 EPLP, supra note 110, at 106.
116 Groombridge & Loh, supra note 5.
117 Non-lawyer judges planned for European patents court, THE LAWYER, Sept. 23, 2002.
118 Cole, supra note 106, at 222-223.
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opposing views, even if they were drawn from the same country.119
Moreover, many Community patent judges drawn from the EU member
states, if not all, have been exposed to the uniform set of laws governing the
European patent. Although they may not interpret and apply that law
uniformly, eventually case law will develop and they will look to those
decisions for guidance.' 
20
To further address these concerns, a two-level centralized patent court
structure could be put into place to guarantee uniformity. Many scholars
and institutions have recognized, and in many cases, encouraged the use of
such a court structure for hearing Community patent disputes. 121 In fact,
the European Commission (the "Commission") has expressed approval for
centralized Community patent courts of first and second instances. 122 Thus,
a court of second instance ensures that the courts of first instance apply and
interpret patent law uniformly just as the federal circuit does with respect to
the district courts in the United States. Uniformity will not be guaranteed
immediately. The courts of first instance will differ as to the interpretation
and application of the patent law, but the court of second instance will level
out these differences.
Closely related to uniformity, the Community patent system provides
legal certainty. Critics of the two-level structure have argued, however, that
"[t]he existence of separate bodies is not conducive to the objective of legal
certainty" because each body would have distinct personnel and distinct
implementing regulations. 23 The Community patent system could address
this argument by adopting the Canadian model where a single court has a
trial division and an appeals division "in which judges would be appointed
to one of the divisions but would ex officio also be a member of the other
division.' 24 Several advantages have been cited for this model, namely:
(1) it would be "more convincing to the users of the appellate court if the
judges working there would also have experience in first instance
jurisdiction," 12 (2) it would prevent a "mentality of competition" between
119 The United States Supreme Court justices have views and backgrounds that differ
significantly.
120 It is unlikely that the Community patent system will accord significant value to
precedent as under the common law tradition because continental Europe follows the civil
law tradition. See Perkins & Mills, supra note 106, at 574.
121 See, e.g., Christopher Heath, Harmonizing Scope and Allocation of Patent Rights in
Europe-Towards a New European Patent Law, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 11, 14-15
(2002).
122 See Regulation Proposal, supra note 45, at 11.
123 Cole, supra note 106, at 222.
124 EPLP, supra note 110, at 17.
125 Id. at 18.
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the first and second instance,1 26 and (3) it would promote the same status
among the judges. 127
Nonetheless, Europeans may have strong reservations about having
judges serving in both courts at the same time. 28 An alternative solution,
broadly supported by Europeans, is to simply make sure that qualified and
experienced judges in the field of patent law sit on the bench in the
centralized courts.' 29 Qualified and experienced judges would make sound
decisions, thus contributing to legal certainty. Moreover, the court of
second instance would be made more convincing to its users by requiring
that its candidate judges serve a term on the court of first instance.
Furthermore, the potential status differential between the first and second
instance courts would be beneficial by attracting highly qualified patent
judges to the second instance court.
The Commission recognizes the value of qualified and experienced
patent judges. 30  The Commission requires that the Community Patent
Court consist of both legal and technical members.13' The legal members
are required to have a high level of experience in patent law.' 32  The
"[t]echnical members must have a high level of experience" in the fields of
chemistry, physics, and mechanics and have "appropriate experience in
patent law."'
33
In addition to requiring that judges be highly qualified, legal certainty
could further be assured by staggering the judges' terms. This ensures that
the expertise developed by the panel of judges could be passed from the
senior judges to the junior judges. 134  The Commission's proposed
provision provides for the staggering of judges by requiring that the legal
and technical judges be appointed for a term of six years with half of the
judge positions being filled every three years. 35 Initially, half the judges






129 Liege Report, supra note 25, at 11. This solution, however, may necessitate the use of
the Canadian model given the small number of experienced patent judges in Europe,
especially as more and more regional courts are created. See EPLP, supra note 110, at 18.
130 See Working Document on Jurisdiction, supra note 52, art. 2(2).
131 Id. art. 2(1).
132 Id. art. 2(2).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 12.
1351 Id. at 11.
136 Id. at 11.
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A centralized court structure does more than establish legal uniformity
and certainty; it eliminates the patent system users' ability to forum shop.
Under the current decentralized system, businesses are free to choose
national courts where they can assure for themselves a favorable result or
where they can attain their commercial objectives. 137 For example, patent
owners may commence proceedings in pro-patent countries, and "infringers
may seek jurisdictions in which patents are readily revoked."'138 Also, since
the Dutch Supreme Court began to issue cross-border injunctions in Lincoln
v. Interlas,' 1 "the Netherlands is 'becoming a favored European
jurisdiction for patent cases."",140 A centralized court system, on the other
hand, eliminates the choice that gives patent system users the ability to
forum-shop.
C. Increased Efficiency
The third significant benefit of a centralized patent system is
efficiency. A patent system is efficient if it produces the desired effect
without wasting resources, 141 the most important of which include time,
money, and skilled professionals.
Efficiency benefits both the patent system users and the national patent
courts and offices by saving them both time and money. Under the current
decentralized system, not only do patents have to be litigated country by
country, but also many national courts do not have sufficient experience in
patent law to quickly and effectively hear and decide patent disputes. 142 In
addition, when the EPO grants a patent, it must be translated into an official
language of each designated EU member state even though translations are
rarely consulted. The Community patent system improves efficiency with
regards to the jurisdictional system and post-grant translations.
1. A More Efficient Jurisdictional System
The inefficiencies of the European patent system are most striking
with respect to the jurisdictional system. Under the current European patent
137 Laddie, supra note 105, at 406.
138 Groombridge & Loh, supra note 5.
139 See Bender, supra note 31, at 68.
140 Idat 72 (quoting Richard A. Kempner & Joe Fricker, Can UK Courts Face the Dutch
Challenge on Cross-Border Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases?, 18 E.I.P.R. 377,
377 (1996)).
141 This definition of "efficient" in the context of patent systems is drawn from the
dictionary definition. See THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1997) ("productive of
desired effects especially without waste").
142 See Cole, supra note 106, at 221.
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system a European patent infringed in several countries must be litigated
country by country. 4 3 Multiple proceedings, however, are becoming more
and more unnecessary not only because national courts inconsistently apply
national intellectual property laws, but also because of the recent trend
towards making national intellectual property laws more consistent with
each other.144 Justice Hugh Laddie commented that if countries "have, in
substance, the same I.P. diet" then it makes little sense "splitting it into
national helpings.' ' 145 Indeed, if time, money, and skilled professionals are
being used in similar proceedings, then patent system users and national
jurisdictional systems are using their resources inefficiently.
The Community patent system, on the other hand, provides a more
efficient patent system. An infringed party only has to bring a single patent
dispute before a single Community patent court whose decision would be
effective throughout the entire EU.
2. Increased Efficiency from Fewer Translations
Once the EPO awards a patent, the patentee must translate the patent
into an official language of each designated country to make it effective.
46
Such a procedure is far from efficient because, in practice, translations are
used in fewer than 5% of cases and sometimes their quality is poor. 147 Yet,
despite the possible inefficiencies of translations, the EU translates its
official publications into all eleven of the EU's official languages so that
Europe's citizens can understand and comply with Community
legislation. 14 Nevertheless, patents and Community legislation differ with
respect to their uses and the persons they affect. Patents affect Europe's
sophisticated parties, such as lawyers, businesses, and inventors, who have
the capacity to understand both technical information and multiple
languages. Community legislation, on the other hand, affects each
European citizen whether or not sophisticated enough to understand
multiple languages.
Compared to the inefficiency of translating a European patent into an
official language of all designated states, the current proposal for a
Community patent requires that the inventor file a patent in one of the EPO
languages and to translate the claims into the remaining two EPO
languages. Then, users could take a large portion of the more than EUR 40
143 EPC, supra note 9, art. 64(3); Laddie, supra note 105, at 406.
144 Laddie, supra note 105, at 405.
145 Id.
146 See EPC, supra note 9, art. 137(2).
147 Liege Report, supra note 25, at 25.
148 Gerd Toscani, Translation and Law - The Multilingual Context of the European Union
Institutions, 30 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 288, 288 (2002).
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million currently spent on translations every year and invest it in research
which could improve Europe's competitive position vis-A-vis the U.S. and
Japan. 149
D. Eliminates Forum-shopping Among the Centralized and
National Patent Systems
A centralized patent system not only eliminates the current forum
shopping problem among national patent systems, but also eliminates
possible forum shopping between the national patent systems as a whole
and the centralized patent system which coexist under the Commission's
regulation proposal. Currently, a patent system user may choose a
country's forum that will assure for it a favorable result so long as that
country has jurisdiction.1 5 1 Under a centralized system, on the other hand,
the legal procedures and substantive law are the same throughout the
system. Then, inconsistency among the lower patent courts would only
result from different interpretations and applications of patent law. And,
even then, a higher court would resolve major inconsistencies among lower
courts.
Jiirgen Schade, a judge for the Federal Patents Court in Munich, argues
that the current forum shopping problem is exaggerated because it is
abusive in only one limited circumstance.152 As a legal strategy, a patent
infringer could apply to a national court for a negative declaratory judgment
to delay the proceedings and prevent the patent-holder from applying for
substantive relief in another country's court. 153 Judge Schade argues that
establishing a centralized patent system is not the only means to prevent
this particular abuse. 154 In fact, he offers less extensive means. The EPC
contracting states could adopt a procedural law enabling the patent-holder
to apply for substantive relief to a court of their choosing which has
jurisdiction over the dispute. 155 Even though other means exist to eliminate
forum-shopping, a centralized patent system still accomplishes this goal
149 id.
150 See Groombridge & Loh, supra note 5.
151 It is not surprising that businesses would require this sort of flexibility considering that
it gives them options to choose from in their efforts to minimize risk.
152 Jtirgen Schade, The Protocol on Litigation under the EPC and the Commission's
proposal for a Community Patent, Special Edition No. 2 of the O.J. of the E.P.O., 170, 180
(2001).
151 Id. This legal strategy is also referred to as the "Belgian Torpedo" phenomenon. See
Groombridge & Loh, supra note 5.




while accomplishing the most important objective to lower the financial
costs of obtaining, maintaining, and enforcing a patent in Europe.
To further discount the forum-shopping problem, Judge Schade argues
that forum-shopping is a "positive advantage" because it provides a degree
of competition among national courts.' 5I Judge Schade supports his
position by pointing to the competition between the district courts in the
United States, welcomed by the legal profession and industry.157 Indeed,
similar competition could develop between the Community patent system's
chambers of first instance; however, the forum-shopping existent among the
national patent systems differs from the potential forum-shopping among
the chambers of first instance because the latter is tempered by a
supervising appeals court.
IV. The Costs of Centralization
Businesses benefit significantly from a centralized Community patent
system because they can obtain, maintain, and enforce patents at a much
lower cost than through the European patent system. As a result, businesses
enjoy increased innovation which leads to economic properity.
Furthermore, EU member states benefit, though indirectly, through
increased tax revenue from those businesses.
With the establishment of a centralized patent system, however,
European governments and their constituents must bear significant costs. A
centralized patent system will likely displace national patent offices and
courts.' 1 At the same time, large businesses, SMEs, and individual
inventors lose the flexibility gained from coexistent patent systems and
increases the distance between them and a patent system.
156 id.
157 Id. at 280-282.
158 This cost is significant given that Germany, who produces a major portion of Europe's
patents, supports a more decentralized system with first instance national courts. See
Michael Becket, Germany Blocks Patent Overhaul, The DAiLY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov.
25, 2002 at 34. One might simply propose a patent system composed of both a centralized
patent system and a decentralized patent system to give patent system users the ability to
choose that system whose benefits better meet their needs. In fact, both the International
Chamber of Commerce and the Commission of the European Communities endorse a system
in which the national, European, and Community patent systems coexist. ICC Policy
Statement, supra note 4; Regulation Proposal, supra note 45, at 18. Note, however, that the
benefits of each individual patent system do not necessarily add up to a total benefit greater
than the total benefit of any one patent system because each patent system is independent of
the others. In other words, their co-existence does not necessarily lead to a synergistic
relationship. Additional costs may be incurred as a result. A hybrid centralized-
decentralized patent system, however, could bring in some benefits from each system.
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A. Displacement of National Patent Systems
When the community patent system displaces the national patent
systems, national patent offices and patent courts will no longer be needed.
As a consequence, national patent office personnel lose their jobs, EU
member states no longer have control over patent examination and
litigation, and EU member states lose a lucrative revenue source arising
from renewal fees 159 and litigation.' 60  Indeed, EU member states on
average obtain over EUR 1,000 in total renewal fees from a patent with a
ten year term and over EUR 5,500 in total renewal fees from a patent with a
twenty year term. 161 Germany, in particular, who produces over 40 percent
of the EPO's patents in relation to those produced by all the contracting
states to the EPC, 162 does not support a centralized Community patent court
because it derives much income from the large quantity of patent litigation
brought to its courts. 63  This is not surprising when considering that a
single patent proceeding in Germany costs GBP 200,000.164
Governments are additionally concerned for the welfare of their patent
agents. Patent agents in Europe derive a major portion of their income from
patent application translations and "some governments are unable to
159 Kara M. Bonitatibus, The Community Patent System Proposal and Patent Infringement
Proceedings. An Eye Towards Greater Harmonization in European Intellectual Property
Law, 22 PACE L. REv. 201, 232 (2001). Germany does not support the proposal for a central
patent court "primarily because of the income that it derives from the large quantity of patent
litigation." Dyson, supra note 93. Even if the Community and national patent systems were
to co-exist, national patent offices would lose business to the Community patent because the
Commission's Regulation Proposal seems to suggest that any fees paid to national patent
offices through the Community patent office would be paid to compensate national patent
offices for services it renders in connection with the Community patent. ICC Policy
Statement, supra note 4; see Regulation Proposal, supra note 45, at 11.
160 Even with the proposal that the national and Community patents co-exist, certain EU
member states still fear that a major portion of the national patent office's workload will be
displaced. Ph. Busquin, The Community Patent, an instrument serving European research,
THE COMMUNiTY PATENT: THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE, at
25 (Mr. Ph. Busquin, the Commissioner for research policy, argues, however, that "these
fears are excessive; need we recall that the creation of the European patent system in 1978
did not lead to the disappearance of the national offices. Under these circumstances, these
fears should not be used as a pretext to distort the proposed system.").
161 See National Renewal Fees, supra note 95.
162 See European Patent Office, 2000 Facts and Figures 15, at http://www.european-
patent-office.org/epo/facts figures/facts2000/pdf/factsfigures_0.pdf (2001).
163 Dyson, supra note 93; see also, Patently Absurd. The EU Should Consider a Fresh
Start in its Patent Quest, FmN. TIMEs (London), Nov. 15, 2002, at 20.
164 The standard price in the United Kingdom is GBP one million. Leader: Matheu
Swallow, THE LAWYER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 3.
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distinguish between their national interests and the interests of a small
group of their citizens, in this case a few hundred patent agents.'0
65
B. Loss of Flexibility from Coexistent Patent Systems
A cost that is particularly important to business interests is the loss of
flexibility assured by coexistent patent systems. The ICC, the world
business organization representing both large and small enterprises, has
stressed that the Community patent system should co-exist with the two
existing decentralized systems. 66 This gives businesses the flexibility to
choose whether to obtain and maintain a patent through the Community
patent system, the European patent system, or the national patent
systems. 
67
Coexistent patent systems also allows for the Community patent to
be convertible into a European patent in certain situations. 168 An important
situation is one where it is discovered that the subject matter of the
Community patent is not new because the subject matter is within the scope
of a national patent application or published national patent. 69 In that case,
the Community patent would convert into a European patent, except that
the bundle of patents generated would not include the national patent from
the member state in which a national prior right exists. 70 Otherwise, the
Community patent would be rendered invalid.' 1
The Chartered Institute of Patent Agents ("CIPA") provides additional
reasons why coexistent patent systems provides flexibility. First, some
individual inventors and SMEs may not need or want patent protection
throughout the entire European Community. 172 Second, "the absence of
165 Di Cataldo, supra note 78, at 29; See also Philip Leith, supra note 59, at 251.
166 See, e.g., ICC Policy Statement, supra note 4.
167 Id. This cost is discounted by the possibility that competing patent systems would
exhaust the supply of competent patent judges and that litigants would forum-shop between




171 See Regulation Proposal, supra note 45, art. 28(l)(f) ("The Community patent may be
declared invalid only on the grounds that ... the subject-matter of the patent is not new
having regard to the content of a national patent application or of a national patent made
public in a EU member State on the date of filing or later or, where priority has been
claimed, the date of priority of the Community patent, but with a filing date or priority date
before that date.").
172 CIPA Comments, supra note 63, P 3.2.1 ("[S]ome patentees operate only within a
localized area and therefore do not want or need patent protection over a much wider area,
such as throughout the Community.").
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patent protection in some parts of the EU for a particular invention creates
greater 7opportunities for free trade in those patent-free EU member
C. Increased Distance Between the Patent System and Its Users
An important cost incurred by litigants in adopting a centralized
patent system is the increased distance between the litigant and the
centralized patent court. 17 4 Because of this distance, litigants, particularly
SMEs, may be dissuaded from litigating a patent.175 Moreover, litigants
lose the "local presence" benefits afforded by current national courts.
These benefits include the confidence that local litigants have in decisions
made, the greater ability to conduct discovery, and the increased ability that
local courts have to understand the cases in the context of the local
situation.
V How to Achieve the Benefits of a Centralized Patent System at Minimal
Cost
By adopting a centralized Community patent system, EU member
states face the potential displacement of their national patent systems. As a
result, businesses lose both the flexibility guaranteed by coexistent patent
systems and the benefits assured by a "local" patent system. Rather than
wait until their national patent systems fall into disuse, EU member states
should presently consider measures to minimize these significant costs.
Personnel from displaced national patent systems could fill positions in
decentralized EPOs and Community patent courts. SMEs and individual
inventors, who primarily benefit from coexistent patent systems, could be
compensated for their lost flexibility by decreasing the cost of obtaining,
maintaining, and enforcing patents. Finally, a "local" patent system could
be assured by competent regional courts.
A. Decentralize Examining and Judging Responsibilities of the
Community Patent
Even though national courts lose litigation revenues, the other costs
resulting from displaced national patent systems, which include lost jobs176
173 id.
174 See P.A. Leonard, Proposal for a Regulation Creating a Community Patent: Towards
a Workable Court System, 23 E.I.P.R. 264, 264 (2001).
175 See id.
176 Laddie, supra note 105, at 407.
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and local user's loss of a local patent system with which they have
familiarity, could be minimized by maintaining the national patent offices,
but converting them into EPO branches, and by employing national patent
judges in the first and second instance Community patent courts. Thus,
examining and other administrative responsibilities of the EPO would be
spread among the national patent offices having solid infrastructures
already in place 177 and qualified patent judges would simply be transferred
to the Community patent system.
Many existing national patent offices have qualified staffs and produce
high quality patent examinations. Since these offices will eventually be
displaced, they should be converted into EPO branches. These regional
patent offices could provide searching and examination services and
"undertake consultancy and service activities (informing companies on
protection, helping them present their files, etc.).' 178
Most business organizations oppose EU member state's desire for the
"re-nationalization" of patent search and examination responsibilities of the
EPO, who would administer the Community patent, to national patent
offices. 17 9 The regional patent offices, however, would not "re-nationalize"
the patent search and examination responsibilities of the EPO. To the
contrary, the regional patent offices would represent instrumentalities of the
EPO.
Business organizations further warn that they will not use a centralized
system in which national patent offices assume searching and examining
responsibilities, unless it produced high quality work. Admittedly, this
would be difficult to achieve by simply giving work to national patent
offices because of their differing procedures. Regional offices, on the other
177 "National patent offices in Member States ... could carry out a range of tasks,
including state of the art searches." Council Fails, supra note 64. See also Liege Report,
supra note 25, at 8.
178 id. at 9.
179 UNICE Message on the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent,
COM (2000) 412 Final, Oct. 25, 2001, at 2 ("If a number of individual national patent
offices are entrusted with search and/or even possibly examination tasks by the EPO
Administrative Council, it will be an impossible task to implement and enforce adequate
systems for quality control and the unitary character of the granted patents. This will be
particularly true in a situation when the national patent office concerned does not fully meet
the objective quality criteria laid down in the PCT; A compromise involving such a hand-
over of work to national patent offices could jeopardise the existing quality and uniformity
of the present European Patent system. Such a situation would be a step back towards
mutual recognition of nationally granted patents, a principle dismissed when the present
European patent system was established."); Liege Report, supra note 25, at 88 ("What is
more, businesses would like to underline the need for all applications for a Community
patent to be processed in a uniform way in order to ensure the total impartiality of the
system. Finally, they stress that a quality documentary search is an essential precondition
for a reliable examination.").
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hand, would have to comply with certain quality requirements and the main
EPO office in Munich would teach and control the procedure.1 80
These "regional" EPOs would also have the "local presence"
advantage characteristic of the proposed "regional" courts.' 8  Thus,
individual inventors and SMEs previously dependent on existing national
patent offices would not be disadvantaged by an otherwise long distance
relationship with the EPO.
Even though the Community patent system would not completely
displace national patent offices by establishing regional EPO patent offices
within national patent office infrastructures, the Community patent system
would displace national patent courts and its corresponding revenue.
Nevertheless, specialized patent judges employed by national courts will
still be needed to fill the judge panels of the Community patent courts' 82
and lawyers and patent agents will continue to receive business from patent
holders seeking to enforce their patent rights in such courts. Furthermore,
inventors will still seek after local patent agents and lawyers to assist them
in filing patent applications and to obtain counseling.
83
B. Decrease the Financial Cost of Obtaining, Maintaining, and
Enforcing Patents for SMEs and Individual Inventors
As the centralized patent system displaces the decentralized patent
system, patent system users lose the flexibility gained from co-existent
centralized and decentralized systems.184 Thus, large businesses could not
choose the system that best suits their needs and SMEs and individual
inventors have no choice but to use the centralized system regardless of its
fifiancial cost and other disadvantages. To minimize these disadvantages, at
least for SMEs and individual inventors, the system could provide
180 Liege Report, supra note 25, at 8.
181 See Working Document on Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 4.
182 Some national courts, however, do not have specialized patent judges such as the
Dutch courts. See Brinkhof, supra note 27, at 470. But, the UK and Germany, for example,
have patent courts with specialized patent judges. See CIPA Comments, supra note 63, A
3.4(b).
183 See Promoting Innovation through Patents - The Follow-up to the Green Paper on the
Community Patent and the Patent System in Europe, COM(99)42 at 15 [hereinafter Follow-
up to Green Paper].
184 Arguably, the only advantage of the co-existent patent systems is flexibility. Cf.
UNICE Position Paper on the Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent System
in Europe, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: COMPENDIUM OF UNICE POSITION PAPERS,
Oct. 31, 1997, at 9 ("By maintaining both systems, companies will be able to enjoy the
desired advantages of the Community patent without losing the proven advantages of the
European patent." But, the only way to simultaneously enjoy the advantages of both
systems would be to obtain a patent from each system for the same invention.)
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mechanisms to make it cheaper for SMEs and individual inventors to obtain
and maintain Community patents. The Community patent system could
accomplish this by providing SMEs and individual inventors a 50%
discount for search, examination, and renewal fees' 85 as is currently done in
the United States.
86
Even under the proposed Community patent system, where SMEs and
individual inventors only have to bring patent disputes before a single court
system, SMEs and individual inventors still cannot afford to enforce their
patent rights. To make litigation affordable, the Community patent system
could ensure that SMEs and individual inventors have access to legal costs
insurance for patents. 187 Several member states have tried such insurance
systems with differing results. 188 France and Sweden discontinued trials of
a legal costs insurance system for patents probably because, in practice,
litigation costs are difficult to predict and these costs can often exceed the
financial limit insured.189 Nonetheless, several British insurance companies
still provide insurance policies that cover only legal costs and not damages.
190 As a result, a few SMEs have brought legal actions that they otherwise
could not afford to bring.19' Therefore, the Community patent system
should ensure that SMEs and individual inventors have access to legal costs
insurance by having member states finance a legal costs insurance
system. 192
C. Establish Competent Regional Courts in the First Instance
Establishing competent regional courts in the first instance minimizes
the harm caused by the distance that a centralized patent court places
between it and potential litigants. Under the current decentralized patent
system, litigants may simply adjudicate their patent disputes in their
national courts, unless, of course, litigants come from different EU member
states. Even then, a defendant is not burdened by distance because she
normally defends in her national courts. Litigants in either position enjoy
the "local presence" that national courts offer. The Community patent
system could provide the benefits of "local presence" by establishing
competent regional courts.
185 Green Paper, supra note 24, at 22.
186 See USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 61.
187 See Green Paper, supra note 24, at 20.
188 Follow-up to Green Paper, supra note 183, at 19.
189 Id.; see CIPA Comments, supra note 63, A 4.5.2.
190 Follow-up to Green Paper, supra note 183, at 19
191 CIPA Comments, supra note 63, A 4.5.2.
192 Green Paper, supra note 24, at 20.
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The Commission itself proposes the creation of "regional chambers" to
the Community Patent Court.1 9 3  After the "central chamber" to the
Community Patent Court is set up, the Commission specifically proposes a
procedure whereby regional chambers are gradually created. ' 9 4  If the
number of cases coming before the central chamber exceeds 150, then a
regional chamber is established in the EU member state "in which the
greatest number of parties involved in litigation before the central chamber
were domiciled."'' 95 Further regional chambers are created by repeating this
procedure. 1
96
Even though establishing regional courts brings the Community Patent
Court physically closer to litigants, this alone is not sufficient to imitate the
"local presence" of national courts. The "regional chambers" must be
competent so that litigants have confidence in the decisions rendered by its
judges. Qualified and experienced judges, drawn from the region in which
the court sits, would ensure the competence of regional chambers. The
Commission's proposal requires that judges have high levels of experience
in patent law and in one of several relevant technical fields.' 97 Highly
qualified and experienced national patent court judges would simply
transfer from the national patent courts displaced by the Community patent
court. Moreover, the Commission's proposal staggers the judges' terms of
office to perpetuate the expertise built up by the judge panel.' 98
Some EU member states would likely have difficulty meeting the
criteria to create regional chambers within their own borders. The
Commission partially addresses the problem by providing a means whereby
EU member states may group together to create a regional chamber. 99 But,
the Commission fails to set forth how to determine where to put the
regional court. Certainly, the EU member state in which the regional
chamber is established would be at an advantage. Traveling judges drawn
from these EU member states in proportion to the number of patent cases
brought before each of their national courts solves this problem.
193 Working Document on Jurisdiction, supra note 52, art. 1(2).
194 See id. art. 5. The UK and the Scandinavian countries support the Commission's
proposal for the creation of regional courts in a second stage, however, several countries,
notably France, Germany, Italy, and Austria push for immediate decentralization. AF,
Competitiveness Council - Deadlock in Negotiations on Community Patent, EUROPEAN
REPORT, Nov. 16, 2002.
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EU member states, reluctant to adopt the centralized Community
patent system, must look beyond the costs associated with its
implementation and see that its benefits far outweigh its costs. In addition,
its benefits have a positive affect on a wide array of interested parties,
including the EU member states themselves. Through a centralized patent
system, SMEs and individual inventors can obtain, maintain, and enforce
their patent rights throughout a much larger territory and for a price and in
an amount of time not much more than through their national patent
systems. Consequently, SMEs and individual inventors have easier access
to greater patent protection, thus encouraging innovation in the EU member
states and throughout the EU and encouraging competition with the U.S.
and Japan.2 °°
Understandably, EU member states are concerned that a purely
centralized patent system displaces their national patent systems and
impinges on long held traditional notions of sovereignty and the
territoriality of patents.20' More importantly, and as a practical matter, EU
member states worry that judges and national patent office personnel will
lose their jobs. Businesses, while supporting a centralized patent system,
also support the continued existence of national patent systems which cater
particularly to the needs of local SMEs and provide businesses in general
with flexibility. The current proposal, calling for the continued existence of
national patent systems, however, only temporarily answers the concerns of
EU member states and businesses. Given the likelihood that the centralized
patent system could entirely displace the current decentralized patent
system, the proposal should minimize this cost so that EU member states
and businesses can better enjoy the benefits of a centralized patent system.
Distributing patent responsibilities among EU member states, while at the
same time maintaining the "unitary" character of the Community patent,
goes far to minimize the displacement cost.
Whatever costs EU member states and businesses incur by
relinquishing familiar and age-old national patent systems, in the end, they
will benefit more from a centralized patent system and even more by taking
measures to minimize the resultant costs.
200 See Green Paper, supra note 24, at 1.
201 Laddie, supra note 105, at 407; see Peter M. Gerhart, Why Lawmaking for Global
Intellectual Property is Unbalanced, 22 E.I.P.R. 309, 309 (2000) (explaining that a global
intellectual property system is still in the distant future because "we are still heavily wedded
to principles of territoriality and sovereignty.").
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